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THE EXTENT OF GROUNDWATER JURISDICTION UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT AFTER RIVERSIDE BA YVIEW HOMES
On December 4, 1985, the United States Supreme Court issued its
opinion in what has been regarded by at least one environmental law
commentator' as a victory for those who wish to protect the wetlands
of the nation from pollution caused by dredge and fill activities. In
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,2 the Court, inter alia,
addressed the meaning of "waters of the United States" under the Clean
Water Act (CWA)3 and the definition of "wetlands" within the Army
Corps of Engineers' (Corps) regulations thereunder.4 Reversing the ruling
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit5 that the
Corps' definition of wetlands must be read narrowly to avoid a fifth
amendment taking issue, 6 the Court recognized that the Corps' broad
ecological definition of wetlands fit within Congress' intent to provide
protection to the nation's waters under the Act to a greater extent than
in prior enabling statutes. The Corps' definition relied upon ecological
and groundwater interconnecting links between the otherwise isolated
wetlands and admittedly regulable navigable waters, rather than de-
pending upon a non-scientific definition containing artificial constraints.
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Rosenbaum, The Supreme Court Endorses a Broad Reading of Corps Wetland
Jurisdiction Under FWPCA § 404, [News & Analysis] 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10008, 10010, 10012 (Jan. 1986); see also Jackson and Armitage, United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes: A Questionable Interpretation of § 404, [News & Analysis] 14 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10366, 10367 (Oct. 1984) (objecting to the Sixth Circuit's decision
as anomalous in light of legislative history and surprisingly consistent jurisprudence).
2. 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1968, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982) (as amended
by the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982)). In 1972, its focus was
fundamentally altered from that of encouraging state programs to that of federal leadership.
R. Beck and C. Goplerud, 3 Waters and Water Rights § 205.2, at 22 (2d ed. 1984).
Perhaps to celebrate this and to emphasize its new purpose, the name was changed in
1977 to the Clean Water Act. The acronym "CWA" appears throughout this comment
to signify the FWPCA or the CWA, whichever was in effect at the time under discussion.
4. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1986). The CWA itself does not define "wetlands," but
Sections 404 and 502 charge the Secretary of the Interior, through the Army Corps of
Engineers, with responsibility for approval for any discharges of dredge and fill materials
into "waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
The dispute over the definition of "wetlands," then, is one of the extent of "waters of
the United States" as defined in the Corps' regulations.
5. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985).
6. Id. at 398.
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The Court effectively adopted the broad definition of wetlands originally
advocated by environmentalists and later endorsed by the Corps, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the United States Courts
of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.7
This decision, and the Court's approach to confirming the Corps'
position under the CWA, suggest several corollaries. If "waters of the
United States" includes wetlands connected to navigable waters through
ecological or groundwater means, conceivably this could include all
wetlands in the country. From the structure of the statute, the Court's
affirmation of the Corps' definition logically applies equally to the EPA's
since their respective definitions are identical.8 If either agency decides
to expand its reach still further, Riverside may provide support for such
an act. Conversely, if the Corps or the EPA decides its definition is
too broad, the extent of waters of the United States could suddenly
constrict. Presumably, the result would be a correlative expansion of
state waters. Such abrupt moves by an agency could upset the balance
between state and federal programs designed to regulate such waters.
Finally, arguably under the Court's reasoning that all waters hydrol-
ogically connected to regulated waters may be regulated, 9 the groundwater
itself is "water of the United States" within the coverage of the CWA.
Riverside may thereby support the proposition that the CWA fills a
perceived gap in federal regulation of the environment.
In the United States, groundwater regulation has largely been a
matter of settling disputes over ownership and access rights. It became
entrenched in the common law and state statutes long before Congress
comprehensively addressed the country's pollution concerns with the
CWA and an array of other statutes either tangentially or directly applied
to groundwater pollution. 0 Among these statutes, the Safe Drinking
Water Act 1 (SDWA) directly addresses groundwater, but only as a source
for drinking water. This limitation omits over sixty percent of the
nation's groundwater from regulation.' 2 Federal case law, though in-
consistent, has tended to indicate the CWA cannot be relied upon to
7. Cf. Jackson and Armitage, supra note 1, at 10366, referring to disputes between
Corps and the EPA, environmentalist groups, the Justice department, and federal courts;
and Rosenbaum, Fifth Circuit Defers to EPA's Expertise, Approves Broad § 404 Wetlands
Jurisdiction, [News & Analysis] 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10397 (December,
1983) (discussing Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc., v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1983)).
8. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
9. Riverside, 106 S.Ct. at 462-63.
10. See infra notes 93-130 and accompanying text.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-1l (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). See infra notes 110-
125 and accompanying text.
12. See text accompanying infra note 85.
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provide protection to groundwater. 13 It seems anomolous that Congress,
in its efforts to establish programs to clean up the environment, would
overlook such a gaping hole in the matrix of statutes it promulgated,
unless it felt the problem was already adequately addressed by state
law. Yet, passage of the CWA and the SDWA indicates it did not feel
this way with respect to surface or drinking water even though states
had sporadically regulated both. Clearly, Riverside addresses the extent
of waters of the United States. Whether it helps in the controversy of
groundwater coverage under the CWA is far less clear.
This Comment examines the potential effects of Riverside upon the
general extent of "waters of the United States" within the meaning of
the CWA. Section I analyzes the Court's opinion in the context of
historic Corps regulation and the potential expansiveness of its approach
to approving the Corps' definition of wetlands. Section II then reviews
the extent to which the groundwater itself, the interconnecting link, is
and should be within the reach of the CWA, and examines whether
Riverside answers this lingering question.
I. ANALYSIS OF Riverside
A. The Opinion
In 1976, Riverside began developing eighty acres of low lying, marshy
lands it owned near Detroit, Michigan. When the company persisted in
discharging fill materials without a permit,' 4 the Corps issued cease and
desist orders and eventually sought and received an injunction in federal
court. The primary issue at trial, whether the Corps had jurisdiction,
depended upon the court's interpretation of the Corps' own regulations
defining wetlands. 5 Under the regulations, whether Riverside's wetlands
were subject to regulation depended upon whether they were "adjacent"
to certain neighboring navigable tributaries. This issue in turn depended
13. See infra notes 131-147 and accompanying text.
14. In preparation for development and to comply with a local zoning ordinance,
the owners began moving fill materials onto the property to raise its elevation. When
confronted by the Corps, they applied for, but failed to receive, a permit from the Corps
under Section 404 of the CWA. Jackson and Armitage, supra note 1, at 10367.
15. According to the regulations at the time, freshwater wetlands included "those
areas that are periodically inundated and that are characterized by the prevalence of
vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction." 33 C.F.R.
§ 209.120(d)(2)(h)(1975) (revoked, 42 Fed. Reg. 37, 133 (1977)). The regulations were so
imprecise, however, as to require the court to supplement them by defining the term
"periodically inundated." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., [Litigation] 7
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20445 (E.D. Mich. 1977), remanded, 615 F.2d 1363 (6th
Cir. 1980), aff'd on remand, Civ. No. 77-70041 (E.D. Mich. May 10, 1981), vacated,
729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985).
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upon whether the characteristic wetland vegetation found there relied
for its sustenance upon flooding from those navigable waterways. 1 6 After
supplementing the Corps' definition with an interpretation of "periodic"
inundation, the district court then examined records of flooding in the
area and concluded that the land had been flooded only five times in
eighty years. This, however, was sufficiently frequent to meet the sup-
plemented definition. Thus, the district court found that the Corps had
jurisdiction,' 7 and the landowner appealed.
While Riverside was being litigated, the Corps amended its definition
of wetlands.' 8 Upon remand for reconsideration' 9 under the new regu-
lations, the district court, without reviewing the facts, found the defi-
nition "broader than its predecessor'' 20 and confirmed the injunction.
On appeal from the second district court decision, the Sixth Circuit
noted requirements of both indicative vegetation and frequent flooding
contained in the definition. Emphasizing this, the court inferred that
the flooding must come from "adjacent streams ... subject to the
jurisdiction of the Corps [or] from 'navigable waters' as defined in the
[CWA],"' 2 1 and that the vegetation must depend upon that inundation
16. The property actually bordered Black Creek and Savan Drain, both tributaries
of navigable-in-fact Lake St. Clair. However, it was contiguous to neither tributary nor
to the lake itself, but was instead separated by strips of "landbridge" serving as barriers
to flooding from the streams. Riverside, [Litigation] 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
at 20445.
Corps experts found "the land [to be] characterized by a predominance of vegetation
types (such as marsh grasses, sedge, cattails, and reeds) adapted to waterlogged or highly
saturated soils." Jackson and Armitage, supra note 1, at 10367 (citing transcript from
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., [Litigation] 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20445 (E.D. Mich. 1977)(hereinafter Transcript)).
The evidence was contradictory, however, as to whether this vegetation was supported
by the water from the tributaries, even though the landbridges were also characterized
by the same vegetation as found in the wetland itself. Testimony established that the
property consisted of a type of soil, Lamson soil, which supported such vegetation wherever
it was found, and this may explain the vegetation instead of proving periodic inundation.
The question at trial, then, was whether these facts were sufficient to make the wetland
"adjacent" to the navigable water tributaries and thus within the jurisdiction of the Corps.
Riverside, [Litigation] 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20446.
17. Id. at 20447.
18. All wetlands (the distinction between freshwater and saltwater was dropped) now
included "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." 33 C.F.R. §
323.2(c)(1986) (emphasis added). Compare supra note 15.
19. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 615 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1980),
aff'd on rehearing, No. 77-70041 (E.D. Mich. 1981), vacated, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 106 S.Ct. 455 (1985).
20. Riverside, 729 F.2d at 396.
21. Id. at 398.
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for its existence. 22 Noting that the tract had previously been prepared
for development 23 and had been farmed in the past, 24 the court decided
the definition of wetlands must be construed narrowly to avoid a fifth
amendment taking clause violation. 25 The Sixth Circuit also doubted that
Congress intended "the Corps' jurisdiction [to go] beyond navigable
water and perhaps the bays, swamps and marshes into which those
navigable waters flow." ' 26 Therefore, since the trial court had found that
the source of the vegetation was the type of soil and not the irregular
floodings, 27 the Corps' jurisdiction could not reach Riverside's property. 28
1. The Holding
The Supreme Court rather quickly disposed of the taking problem
by noting that extension of Corps jurisdiction is not equivalent to denial
22. The court examined the preamble to the new regulations, and noted that the
Corps responded to a misconception by others that the word "normally" required a
recorded history before the area would qualify:
The preamble notes that the term "normally" was used in the original version
... "to respond to those situations in which an individual would attempt to
eliminate the permit review requirement ... by destroying the aquatic vegetation,
and to those areas that are not aquatic but experience an abnormal presence
of aquatic vegetation." . . . Significantly, the preamble notes that it is still the
case under the new regulation that "[t]he abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation
in a non-aquatic area would not be sufficient to include that area within the
Section 404 program." . . . Neither inundation nor aquatic vegetation would be
sufficient, standing alone, to bring a piece of land within the definition. Both
must be present, and the latter must be caused by the former.
Id. at 395-96 (emphasis by the court).
23. Sixty of the eighty acres in the tract had been platted, and fire hydrants and
sewers installed, in 1916. 729 F.2d at 392. The improvements, however, would be useless
and obsolete after they were covered with fill material to a depth of several feet. Jackson
and Armitage, supra note 16, at 10367 (citing Transcript, January 15, 1977, at 134).
24. Riverside, 729 F.2d at 392.
25. Id. at 398. The court parallels the Riverside case with Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979) (The navigation servitude of the nation's
navigable waters does not extend to a formerly landlocked but tidally flooded lagoon in
Hawaii just because landowners had dredged a channel to the ocean to allow vessel traffic;
thus, landowners could deny public access even though they must submit to Corps permit
process for further improvements.) (Blackman, J., dissenting).
In Kaiser, the Corps had tried to assert that the extension of navigability-in-fact by
the landowner to the lagoon had thereby granted public access by virtue of the navigation
servitude. But the Court looked to the history of the property and concluded that it had
been private property and remained so. Thus, the Corps could not insist upon the extension
of the navigational servitude to the landowner's property without taking away his property
right of limiting access. It was true, though, that the navigability-in-fact gave the Corps
jurisdiction and required the landowner to submit to its permit process for any further
improvements in its lagoon.
26. Riverside, 729 F.2d at 397.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 398. See also supra note 16.
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of a permit to discharge fill materials. A taking issue might ripen upon
denial, but the Sixth Circuit's narrow reading of the Corps' definition
of wetlands for jurisdictional purposes was simply unnecessary and would
not avoid the constitutional difficulty anyway. 29 Should a taking be
found after denial of a permit, the landowner's remedy was for just
compensation, not injunction.30
Consequently, the Court treated the problem as one of statutory
interpretation, and applied the presumption that courts should defer to
an agency's reasonable interpretation of its tasks under its enabling
statute.3" The Sixth Circuit had overlooked that, under the new regu-
lation, groundwater could also sustain the indicative vegetation;32 flood-
ing from surface waters is only one way to provide the moisture needed
to establish the wetlands. Thus, Riverside's property fit under the Corps'
definition of wetlands.33
The Court then proceeded to review and approve the reasonableness
of the Corps' interpretation of "waters of the United States" as used
in the CWA. Inferring from legislative history that Congress intended
a broad, systematic view in its attempt "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of the nation's waters,3" the
Court concluded that Congress meant to repudiate limitations imposed
on federal regulation by earlier water pollution statutes, and to exercise
its commerce power to regulate some waters not classically considered
navigable.15
29. "[An] overbroad regulation of even completely submerged property may constitute
a taking." 106 S. Ct. 455, 459 n.4 (1985).
30. Id. at 459-60.
31. "An agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to
deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress."
Id. at 461 (citing Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 126, 105 S. Ct. 1102,
1108 (1985), and Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S. Ct.
2778, 2781-83 (1984)).
32. See supra note 18.
33. "Indeed, the regulation could hardly state more clearly that saturation by either
surface or ground water is sufficient to bring an area within the category of wetlands,
provided that the saturation is sufficient to and does support wetland vegetation." 106.
S. Ct. at 460-61.
34. Id. at 462 (citing § 101 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982)).
35. Other than the taking clause discussion, supra notes 29-30 and accompanying
text, the Court did not examine the reasonableness of Congress' intent in this respect,
probably because it has been discussed at length in the past. For a discussion of the
constitutionality of such expansiveness, see NRDC v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.
1975) (Section 404 reaches to the full extent of the commerce clause.); United States v.
Holland, 373 F.Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974) ("Waters of the United States" is a term
much broader than the traditional understanding of "navigable waters."); United States
v. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975) (For all practical purposes, the CWA
appears to reach any waters going anywhere, including any waterways where water could
[Vol. 47
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Because of the evident breadth of concern for protection exhibited
by Congress, the Court felt it was reasonable for the Corps to interpret
this to mean Congress wished to regulate the entirety of an aquatic
ecosystem, including all waters hydrologically connected thereto, which
it could reach with the commerce clause.16 The Corps is not constrained
by its earlier enabling statutes17 to jurisdictional boundaries dependent
upon a separate system of the imaginable reach of the navigable waters
definition.38
2. Analysis
Though set within the context of dredge and fill activities as regulated
by the Corps, presumably the Court's clarification applies to the EPA,
too, since the same term is used throughout the CWA. 39 At first glance,
end up in a public body of water, including underground water.). But see infra note 42
and accompanying text. See also R. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control
in Federal Environmental Law 687, 693 (1974); Annot., What are "Navigable Waters"
Subject to the Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act As Amended, 52
ALR Fed. 788 (1986) (underground water not covered).
36. The Court reasoned:
We cannot say that the Corps' conclusion ... is unreasonable. In view of
the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and
the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps'
ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent
wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands
may be defined as waters under the Act.
.. For example, wetlands that are not flooded by adjacent waters may still
tend to drain into those waters . . . [,] may serve to filter and purify water . . .
and to slow the flow of surface runoff . . . thus prevent[ing] flooding and
erosion . . . and may "serve significant natural biological functions, including
food chain production, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting
sites for aquatic . . . species." . . . In short . . . wetlands . . . may function
as integral parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture creating
the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent bodies of water.
106 S. Ct. at 463.
37. See text accompanying infra notes 50-54.
38. The Court went on to say:
Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly. Although the
Act prohibits discharges into "navigable waters". . . the Act's definition of
"navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States" makes it clear that
the term "navigable" as used in the Act is of limited import .... Congress
evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation
by earlier water pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers under the
Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed
"navigable" under the classical understanding of that term.
106. S. Ct. at 462. See also infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
39. In fact, the definition of "waters of the United States" is not within Section
404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), at all, but appears under Section 502(7),
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this suggests that, should there be any effects upon the respective ju-
risdictions of the EPA and the Corps, they would be offsetting, since
an increase or decrease in the jurisdiction of one should result in a
corresponding change in that of the other. As will be seen herein,
however, this is not entirely true. 40 Further, expansion of the Corps'
jurisdiction may affect state regulatory structures, in spite of Congress'
explicit disavowal of preemption under Section 404. 4 ' This could become
particularly important in the area of groundwater regulation.
One peculiar aspect of the opinion is that the Court never actually
decided exactly how far Congress intended the CWA to reach, nor
whether that reach was permissible under the Constitution. The Court
merely noted Congress meant for the CWA to reach much further than
earlier statutes; whether Congress actually meant to reach wetlands con-
nected only hydrogeologically to navigable waters remains an open ques-
tion. Since it was reasonable for the Corps to interpret Congress' signals
as it did, however, the Court simply could not say the agency was
wrong .42
As a result, the opinion is not as strong as it could be, and it is
certainly not a resounding victory for environmental protection. It leaves
open the possibility that there may be other equally reasonable inter-
pretations of the extent of "waters of the United States" under the
statute. The Corps may tell us tomorrow that it has decided the waters
of the United States does not reach nearly as far; 43 based on the Court's
opinion in Riverside, the waters would suddenly constrict. Likewise, the
EPA and the Corps may disagree as to their definitions of wetlands,
and both could theoretically have a reasonable interpretation of the same
statute. Since the Court affirmed a Corps definition identical to that
of the EPA, without mentioning this identity and its effect upon the
EPA's definition, should the EPA wish to constrict the definition, the
Corps could theoretically resist this under the authority of the Court.
44
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982), where it further defines "navigable waters" as used within
the CWA. The Corps' definition of wetlands in its regulations (supra note 18) is identical
with that promulgated by the EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1986). See also 43 Op. of the
Atty. Gen. of the United States No. 15, at 5 (September 5, 1979).
40. See text accompanying infra notes 78-84.
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(t) (1982) (Nothing in Section 404 shall preclude a state from
controlling discharges of dredge and fill materials in navigable waters within its jurisdiction,
except as it might impair the Corps' authority to maintain navigation.).
42. 106 S. Ct. at 463. See also supra note 36.
43. In fact, the Reagan Administration is making just such noises. See Rosenbaum,
supra note 1, at 10010 n.37, 10011.
44. In practice, however, such an official disagreement is unlikely. The Corps raised
the different definitions issue in a letter to the Justice Department, and the United States
Attorney General issued an opinion indicating the statute required consistency. 43 Op. of
the Atty. Gen. of the United States No. 15 (September 5, 1979) (The structure of the
[Vol. 47
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The greatest weakness of the decision is that it missed a chance to
decide the law respecting waters of the United States. Had the Court
interpreted Congress' intent as to the extent of such waters under the
statute, it would never have reached the issue of reasonableness of the
Corps' regulations; they would have been either too broad, or not broad
enough, in light of the Congressional mandate. The Corps and the EPA
would not be free to establish their own versions of the law as they
see fit, and considerable controversy as to the extent of the CWA would
have been resolved.
In all due respect to the Court, it can be argued that it followed
its own rule that court judgment should not be substituted for that of
the agency where Congress has not clearly expressed its intent to the
contrary. 45 The justification for this rule, however, lies in the doctrine
that, where Congress has clearly delegated the decision to the agency,
this delegation presumably relies upon the agency's expertise and should
be honored. Here, though, Congress did not express, clearly or otherwise,
how "waters of the United States" shall by interpreted, much less by
whom.46 Further, it relied upon the term "navigable waters" at the risk
of considerable confusion with earlier statutes.47 Finally, the Court could
have decided whether it was within Congress' power under the commerce
clause to reach wetlands, and if not, then whether the Corps' regulations
were too broad. Instead, it left the first question unanswered and leaped
directly to the reasonableness inquiry. This seemingly unnecessary deferral
to agency discretion 48 actually raises the much larger issue developed
herein, that being whether Riverside can be read to affect groundwater
coverage under the CWA.
Weaknesses notwithstanding, the Court confirmed the broad inter-
pretation of "waters of the United States" as consistent with the view
of the CWA held by environmentalists, the EPA, and the majority of
courts.49 It may turn out in the long run that the EPA's jurisdiction
statute and the legislative history indicate Congress intended the EPA to have the final
administrative responsibility for construing the term "navigable waters" under the CWA.).
45. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984)
(Where Congress has not clearly indicated its intent to the contrary, courts should not
substitute their judgment for that of the agency empowered by the statute.).
46. But see supra note 44.
47. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
48. Indeed, the opinion seems a bit schizophrenic on the issue of whether it is deciding
the Corps' authority or deferring to the agency's interpretation of Congressional intent.
See infra note 74.
49. Cf. Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984) (The Corps' jurisdiction extends
to an intrastate lake incapable of interstate navigation but used to sustain and foster
interstate commerce.); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc., v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th
Cir. 1983) (EPA could consider soil, hydrology, and additional species of vegetation in
its wetlands determination.); United States v. M.C.C., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501 (1lth Cir.
1987]
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emerges as the real beneficiary of Riverside; whether this accrues to the
states is unclear. Review of Corps involvement in the CWA helps to
understand the significance of this decision.
B. Historical Perspective of Corps Jurisdiction
At common law, the concept of navigable waters developed as a
means of settling disputes between riparian property owners over sub-
merged and tidal lands and between these property owners and pro-
ponents of public use of such waters.50 There was no prohibition against
obstructing navigable rivers5 until Congress borrowed the concept52 to
empower the Army Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors
Act (RHA) of 189913 to protect the nation's waterways by controlling
dredging and filling. Though this implies that the term "navigable"
means "navigable in fact," it has become settled law that the Corps'
reach does not depend upon a stream's navigability, but that "[its]
authority is as broad as the needs of commerce." '5 4 At least in part
because of this traditional responsibility, and possibly to avoid any
conflict with, and to take advantage of, a system of regulation already
in place, Congress provided that the EPA, whom it had empowered
with an analogous discharge permit responsibility for most pollution
discharges under the CWA,55 would share this responsibility with the
Corps when it came to dredge and fill discharges. The Corps would
1985) (Propellers of a tugboat disturbing vegetation in a channel cut through marshland
amounts to a discharge of pollution under the CWA.), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3533 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1986) (No. 85-1292); and United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235
(7th Cir. 1985) (Whether reservoirs were improperly converted to cranberry farms had
been farmed in the past was irrelevant to whether they were wetlands when converted.).
See also supra note 7.
50. Rosenbaum, supra note 7, at 10400.
51. United States v. M.C.C, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1506-07 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing
Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1877)), petition for cert. filed, 54
U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1986) (No. 85-1292).
52. Courts have ruled consistently that the term "navigable waters" in the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899 (hereinafter RHA) is identical to the common law term and
that the Corps has no authority to alter the RHA navigablility reach through regulations.
Rosenbaum, supra note 7, at 10400. See also 43 Op. of the Atty. Gen. of the United
States No. 15, at 6 n.11 (September 5, 1979) (Navigable waters for purposes of the RHA
are more restrictive than under the CWA.).
53. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-466g (1982).
54. Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 173, 100 S. Ct. at 389 (citing United States v. Appalachian
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27, 61 S. Ct. 291 (1940)).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982) (Section 402 of the CWA, establishing the NPDES
authority for the EPA to issue permits for discharge of pollutants into the nation's waters).
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issue the permits as it always had, but it would do so in light of
guidelines issued by the EPA.16
Either understandably 7 or recalcitrantly5 8 the Corps initially viewed
the extent of its wetlands jurisdiction as nil, confining the definition of
"waters of the United States" as consistent with its need to guard
against obstructions to navigability-in-fact. After considerable conflict
among the Corps, the EPA, and environmentalists, one court settled
the issue for its district" by forcing the Corps to include all navigable
waters, adjacent wetlands, and other more isolated areas such as prairie
potholes. 6° The Corps subsequently acquiesced to this holding throughout
its jurisdiction. In 1977, Congress substantially revised the CWA, 61 con-
ferring enforcement authority for the respective permit processes. 62 Fol-
lowing the 1977 revisions to the CWA, the Corps began to broaden its
implementation of Section 404, declaring that the wetlands were "vital
areas that constitute a productive and valuable public resource, the
unnecessary alteration or destruction of which should be discouraged as
contrary to the public interest." ' 63 By this statement, the Corps established
a presumption against filling work in a wetland unless the applicant
clearly demonstrates the water dependency of the project or that other
alternatives are not practicable. 64 Clearly, the Corps had begun, if never
56. The CWA defines "pollutants" as, inter alia, "dredged soil, ... rock, sand,
[and] cellar dirt." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982). The Corps and EPA duties are assigned
under the Act at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also 43 Op. of the
Atty. Gen. of the United States No. 15, at 2 (September 5, 1979) (The Act recognized
the Corps' traditional responsibility under the RHA.).
57. For a sympathetic view of the Corps' behavior in its early efforts to shoulder
responsibility under the CWA, see Habicht, Implementing Section 404: The View From
the Justice Department, [News & Analysis] 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10073,
10075 (Mar. 1986).
58. For a not-so-sympathetic view, see Liebesman, The Role of EPA's Guidelines in
the Clean Water Act § 404 Permit Program-Judicial Interpretation and Administrative
Application, [News & Analysis] 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Ent. L. Inst.) 10272 (July, 1984).
59. NRDC v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) (Section 404 of the CWA
is not limited to traditional principles of navigability; the Corps' regulations are insufficient
to cover the statutory intent, and must be re-issued so as to be consistent with Congress'
intent to reach all waters to the maximum extent permissible under the commerce clause.).
60. A prairie pothole is a pond apparently isolated from any visible source of moisture
other than rain water. Liebesman, supra note 58, at 10273.
61. Clean Water Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 1251
(1978)). See also Legislative History of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4326 (1977).
62. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)-(1) (1982) (EPA enforcement of § 404) and 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319 (1982) (EPA authority to order compliance with conditions and limitations of §§
402 and 404, including civil and criminal penalties).
63. Liebesman, supra note 58, at 10273 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(1) (1977), as
revised 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2) (1982), re-enacted, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(4) (1986)).
64. Id.
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before, to take the protection of wetlands quite seriously. It was at this
juncture that the amendment to the definition of wetlands in the Corps
regulations occurred.
C. Effect of Riverside on Waters of the United States
The Corps' revised regulations, passed in response to NRDC v.
Calloway, 6 had originally specified wetlands as those areas contiguous
to navigable waters and recognizable by periodic inundation and a
prevalence of certain species of vegetation that required saturated soil
conditions for growth and reproduction. 66 When revised, the wetland
definition contained two significant changes, only one of which was
discussed by the Supreme Court in Riverside.
1. Expansion by ecological means
One significant change consists of the wetlands vegetation used to
indicate presence of a regulated area. The vegetation must now be that
"typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions," including plants
which can exist without saturated soil (facultative hydrophytes), as well
as those which require such conditions (obligate hydrophytes). The dif-
ference was ably demonstrated in A voyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc.
v. Marsh,6" where the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Corps' broad reading
of its wetlands definition in upholding denial of a permit to convert
most of a 20,000 acre tract of Red River backwater wetlands in central
Louisiana to soybean fields by ditching, leveling and deforestation. The
comments accompanying promulgation of the new regulations noted
explicitly that the change in vegetation indicators was intended to close
a loophole in the old definition "excluding many forms of truly aquatic
vegetation that are prevalent in an inundated or saturated area, but that
do not require saturated soil from a biological standpoint for their
growth and reproduction. ' 68 Relying upon these comments, the court
agreed with the agency that the better reading of the definition includes
those plants which, though they are tolerant of saturated soil conditions,
can survive elsewhere.
The Riverside trial court spent some effort assuring itself that the
indicative vegetation, found both on the navigable waterway shores and
on Riverside's property, was in fact connected over the land bridge
between them. Finding this, the court then determined that this flora
was supported by the lake, and the land was thus within the jurisdiction
65. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975); see supra note 59.
66. See text accompanying supra note 15.
67. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
68. Id. at 912 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323 (1977)).
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of the Corps. 69 The groundwater concept, discussed herein in Section
II, suggests that the continuity of wetland flora, across the land bridge
from the recognized regulable waters to the property in question, may
not be necessary. A finding that such continuity exists, however, would
further support a ruling that the property is in fact covered by the
statute. Additionally, an intervening land bridge could be much larger
if the indicative vegetation included facultative hydrophytes, instead of
being limited to obligate hydrophytes. 70
At least one commentator has suggested that isolated wetlands may
be brought under the CWA via ecological connection through the fauna
involved. 71 Specifically, migratory birds are key components of wetlands
which are protected by the CWA. Cumulative loss of smaller, discon-
nected wetlands that serve as breeding grounds for such birds at other
times of the year could affect the ecology of regulated waters. The
Supreme Court seemed to emphasize this connection in its summary of
the justification for deference to the Corps' judgment. 72 If such ecological
interconnection comprises an acceptable test of whether wetlands are to
be regulated, every wetland lying within the flyways of migratory birds
would be included, which could well include every wetland in the entire
continental United States. 73
2. Expansion by means of Aquifer
The current regulations also expand the potential sources for moisture
or saturated soil conditions, including groundwater which may seep
hydrogeologically to the surface and drain into other navigable waters.
Failure to recognize this causes one to read the words "or ground
water" completely out of the regulation; it was just such a failure by
the Sixth Circuit that led the Court to overrule the lower court's more
restrictive reading emphasizing inundation.
Consider just how broadening this change in interpretation may turn
out to be. Though the definition of "waters of the United States" may
be as broad as the reach of the commerce clause, the definition of
wetlands as approved by the Supreme Court in Riverside still requires
adjacency to other bodies of water over which the Corps has juris-
69. Riverside, [Litigation] 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20445.
70. If a suspected wetland area is covered by both facultative and obligate hydrophytes,
the former will extend into fringe areas where the latter will be unable to reach. If the
facultative hydrophytes indicate the extent of the putative wetland, it will be larger by
definition than that area in which obligate hydrophytes can survive.
71. Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 10011.
72. See supra note 36.
73. The exact extent of this expansion factor would make an interesting study, but
such lies outside the scope of this Comment. It seems obvious, though, that this should
extend to the entirety of the flyways crossing the continent.
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diction. 74 An isolated pothole which is occasionally soaked by rainwater,
and thus is able to support the requisite vegetation, but is otherwise
completely independent of any streams which would fall under the
jurisdiction of the Corps, probably would not be included. The definition
must refer, however, to areas saturated by an aquifer, or a large un-
derground water bearing stratum which seeps to the surface to form
wetlands that from the surface appear to be isolated, but which are
either fed by, or which feed, a stream under the jurisdiction of the
Corps. The surface territory covered by such an underground aquifer
may extend many miles beyond what traditionally has been thought of
as navigable waters, reaching many more of the isolated pothole swamps
thought immune from the CWA. 75
Carrying this reasoning a logical step further, the same justification
for including wetlands fed by groundwater within "waters of the United
States" suggests that the groundwater itself should be included. The
Court found it reasonable to be concerned with pollution discharged
into wetlands adjacent to navigable waters even though the wetlands
were not flooded by such navigable waters through surface connections.7 6
Arguably this could be limited to those wetlands which are simply above
the high water mark of the nearby navigable waters, but which feed
into them through surface runoff. Such drainage could, however, also
occur underground through the aquifer which feeds both surface bodies
of water. Dredge and fill materials discharged into isolated wetlands
would not directly have to threaten navigable waters with physical erosion
of sediment. Wetlands serve as floodwater reservoirs, and conceivably,
interchange between isolated wetlands and navigable waters through
underground strata could be as important to alleviation of flooding as
surface overflow. Further, any pollutant which does intrude into the
aquifer could clog the porous rock structure, thereby reducing the aqui-
fer's benefit to the stream.
Riverside's property was not connected in any visible way to the
streams feeding into Lake St. Clair. Surface flooding seldom occurred. 77
The landbridge between the property and the streams was as much as
74. "We are not called upon to address the question of the authority of the Corps
to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of
open water . . . and we do not express any opinion on that question." Riverside, 106 S.
Ct. at 462 n.8.
75. Scientific research into the extent of groundwater in the New Orleans area dem-
onstrates that mapped aquifers underlying Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River
reach as far as Donaldsonville, Vacherie, and Hammond, distances of as much as thirty
miles. Maps examined in Louisiana Coastal Zone Management Office. See also infra notes
91-92 and accompanying text.
76. Riverside, 106 S. Ct. at 463. See also excerpt supra note 36.
77. Riverside, [Litigation] 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20445.
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200 feet wide in places. For significant interchange to occur between
the property and the tributaries, an aquifer would necessarily be involved.
There was, however, no indication in the reported opinions that the
record established the existence of such a connecting groundwater body.
Nor did the Court explicitly say that an interconnecting aquifer would
fall within the definition. Further, for the Court so to declare would
require a reading of the facts which it is not clear was even argued by
the Corps, a step the Court was unlikely to take. This notwithstanding,
while it can be argued that the Riverside holding does not embrace
groundwater as within "waters of the United States," the facts appear
to insist upon the contrary conclusion.
D. Program Conflicts
Absent approved state permit programs under Sections 402 and 404
of the CWA, the EPA and the Corps appear to have co-extensive
jurisdiction but different responsibilities. If Riverside confirms that the
Corps could reasonably infer Congress intended under Section 404 to
use all its commerce power, then the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction
is limited only by the limits of the waters of the United States, as is
that of the EPA. Riverside reinforces this presumption by confirming
the broad definition of "waters of the United States" within the context
of a dredge and fill situation.
A shift in the definition of this jurisdiction nay affect the agencies
differently. Each has veto power over the other's permit grants, but the
Corps' appears to be limited. The EPA can veto the Corps' permit no
matter where the construction is proposed.78 Likewise, the Corps' power
to" veto is implicit in the limitation upon the EPA to issue Section 402
permits. 79 The Corps, however, must issue its permits within the EPA/
Corps developed guidelines, so that the EPA has a voice in the Corps'
permit system which has no analogous Corps input into the EPA's
system. States are also permitted to take over administration of both
agencies' permit systems, except for the Corps' direct authority over
navigable-in-fact waters. There is no such qualification for the Section
402 permit system. Additionally, the EPA approves both Section 402
and Section 404 state plans and, once a Section 404 state plan has been
approved, orders the Corps to cease its permit system with regard to
non-navigable-in-fact waters. Effectively, with state cooperation, the EPA
can remove Corps jurisdiction to a large extent.
Only in the absence of state plans does the Corps' jurisdiction reach
to the full extent of the waters of the United States. Riverside may well
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1982).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 402(a)(1) (1982) (EPA can issue permits, except as provided in Section
404, where Corps has permit responsibility.).
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extend this jurisdiction into waters the states are accustomed to regulating
under state plans which are not approved by the EPA. The CWA
specifically disavows preemption of state programs regulating dredge and
fill activities in navigable waters within its jurisdiction. 0 There is no
analogous disavowal within Section 402, suggesting that Congress meant
to preempt states' regulation of non-dredge and fill pollutants except
within an approved state Section 402 program. The statute includes,
however, a general "savings clause""' designed to assure a significant
state role in protection of its environment. 2 Further, Section 401 requires
state certification that a proposed permit meets state statutory limitations
allowed under the CWA if they impose greater protections for the
environment than does the CWA.
Where the states do not participate in the federal permit systems
under Sections 402 or 404, they can prevent either agency from issuing
a permit by refusing to grant a Section 401 certification. Only in the
case of state inaction can the EPA grant such certification on its own.
Nothing in Sections 401 through 404 says explicitly that states give up
this power by receiving approval to administer the federal permit systems.
Nevertheless, there is some suggestion that the federal agencies can
overrule states if the states decide, through their approved state plans,
that a permit should issue. If a state objects to a permit, the agency
may issue the permit anyway, over the state's objection, if the discharge
source lies outside the state. 3 By comparison, under Section 404, the
EPA may stop a state permit from issuing, but there is no obvious
power to overrule a state if it says a permit should not issue. Thus,
states seem to have more authority in the decision process under Section
404 than under Section 402. Nothing in the statute, however, says the
states give up their Section 401 certification powers.
Consequently, should Riverside encourage the EPA or the Corps to
further expand their jurisdiction or simply to step up activities in new
areas, the states retain a strong influence over incursions into state
concerns. This may become significant, even where states acquiesce to
an EPA operated Section 402 program or a full Corps Section 404
program, should the agencies exert control over groundwater. Indeed,
the EPA has recently begun a "Groundwater Protection Strategy" con-
sisting of four goals: (1) fostering strong state programs; (2) focusing
80. See supra note 41.
81. Section 505(e) states that nothing in the statute shall be construed as impairing
any right of the states under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982).
82. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 810, 812 (1987).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4) (1982). See also Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. at 810-11 (The
CWA contemplates a lesser role for affected states which share an interstate waterway
with the source.).
[Vol. 47
COMMENTS
upon inadequately addressed problems (e.g. leaking underground storage
tanks, landfills, and pesticides); (3) adoption of guidelines for protection
of groundwater used for drinking and other beneficial uses; and (4)
strengthening its internal program organization. This strategy appears to
rely upon specialized statutes addressing specific pollution product con-
cerns. s4 Conspicuously absent is any CWA basis for the strategy.
II. THE CWA AND GROUNDWATER
At the time of the CWA's passage, over sixty billion gallons of
groundwater was used daily, amounting to approximately 21.5% of all
water use. Of this, about half was used for agricultural and industrial
purposes, and 75% of the other half served as sources for public water
systems across the country. Further, groundwater use was increasing
rapidly, as evidenced by the addition of a half-million new wells each
year. 5
Pollution of groundwater is already occurring, in concert with the
pollution of surface waters addressed by the CWA. Because of the
nature of groundwater, it presents unique problems distinct from those
of surface water. Largely because of its slow, percolating recharge and
often molasses-like movement, groundwater cannot purge itself rapidly
as can surface water.8 6 Hence, allowing pollution now becomes an ir-
revocable decision lasting for many years, maybe even centuries. When
groundwater does purge itself by expelling the contaminated water, it
usually does so by forcing it to the surface where it pollutes surface
water. As a result of this alone, there is good reason to believe the
CWA may cover groundwater. Whether Riverside amounts to authority
for this proposition remains to be seen.
A. Nature of Groundwater
Most underground rocks contain water. Even the relatively imperme-
able rocks which form aquifer boundaries by impeding underground
water flow will have cracks containing water. It has been estimated that
underground aquifers contain as much as 150 times the amount of
freshwater contained in all the surface storage in the continental United
States, including the Great Lakes.17
84. R. Beck and C. Goplerud, supra note 3, § 212.2, at 268-69 (2d ed. Supp. 1985).
See also infra notes 105-125 and accompanying text.
85. Wilson, Ground Water-Are They Beneath the Reach of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments? 5 Envtl. Aff. 545, 546 (1976) (citing testimony before
House & Senate investigating committees).
86. Groundwater moves at a surprisingly slow pace; probably 95% moves at a rate
of less than five feet per day. R. Kazman, Modern Hydrology 190 (1972). See also Wilson,
supra note 85, at 546-47.
87. R. Kazman, supra note 86, at 195.
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Underground water aquifers usually occur in alluvial deposits, rel-
atively porous sedimentary rock strata laid down either by glacial scouring"s
or by ancient streams and rivers eroding sand particles from higher
ground and depositing them on lower lying areas. Successive deposits
of silt form clay layers which metamorphose over geologic time and
under pressure to form less permeable rock layers. This same pressure
warps and folds the layers, exposing them irregularly at the surface in
outcrops where water can percolate into them from precipitation and
surface flooding. s9
Aquifers with high permeability 9° serve three principle functions: to
filter water through sand particles, to serve as a pipeline by transmitting
water from the recharge areas to discharge outcrops or withdrawal wells,
and to store water. Water percolates into aquifers through soil layers
or enters directly from streams and lakes which contact the outcrops
themselves. Such "bank storage" frequently, if not usually, occurs on
both sides of such streams, resulting in the aquifer effectively straddling
the stream. Water stored in this manner readily drains back into the
stream when the stream's water level drops below the underground water
table. As a result, the water table in alluvial aquifers rises and falls
with the flooding cycles of recharging streams and lakes associated with
it. 91
Water may also exit such an aquifer through other outcroppings to
form familiar "springs" which feed other streams, or it may be forced
to the surface by underground pressure to form artesian wells. It may
also pool on the surface to create lakes or marshy wetlands where the
capacity of the aquifer has been exceeded by the recharge. Thus, ap-
parently isolated wetlands at considerable distances from a stream could
be connected hydrologically to it.92 It was this phenomenon which led
the Corps and the EPA to include the "or groundwater" phraseology
into their definitions of regulable wetlands, and which convinced the
Court that the inclusion was justified.
88. Glacial sheets waxed and waned across the North American continent in the
ancient past, picking up rocks of all sizes and depositing them in thick, complex blankets
above the bedrock. This glacial till provides a good potential source of groundwater
wherever found. C. Fetter, Applied Hydrology 188 (1980).
89. R. Kazman, supra note 86, at 199.
90. Permeability is a measure of a rock stratum's capacity to transmit water or other
fluids. This is distinct from, but related to, its porosity, which is a property reflecting
the amount of open spaces occurring between the individual particles of rock. The latter
may be closely spaced, resulting in a low permeability, or cavernous where erosion has
formed channels in the rocks. Id. at 160-65.
91. Groundwater levels are extremely sensitive to minute changes in pressure which
may be transmitted over considerable distances. For example, fluctuations in the Mississippi
River stages at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, were reproduced in an observation well connected
hydrologically with the river but over two miles away. Id. at 171-74.
92. Id.
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B. Regulation of Groundwater
Regulation of groundwater has historically been the responsibility
of the states. Congress has been ambiguous in demonstrating its intent
to take charge of groundwater regulation, possibly because of the depth
of traditional state regulation. Likewise, federal courts have found little
authority within the existing statutes with which to affirm federal ju-
risdiction.
1. Riparian Rights versus Prior Appropriation
Two widely different state approaches developed, each reaching dom-
inant acceptance depending largely upon the scarcity of fresh water in
the region. In areas where fresh water was plentiful, the common law
developed the concept that the ownership of land brought with it own-
ership of the underlying water and minerals. A landowner was free to
reduce to possession anything he found on or under his land or to sell
it in place to others who could do so.93 Because of the "pipeline" effect
of underground fluid flow, this meant that a landowner or his assignee
could extract water from beneath his land by simply drilling a well and
pumping out water that migrated to it, even if the migration was from
beneath neighboring land. This became known as the English rule, or
the rule of capture.9 4
Two American modifications to the English rule, the doctrine of
correlative rights and the "American rule," developed in response to a
rising need for conservation and to the apparent inequity and waste-
fulness resulting from the rule of capture. 95 The doctrine of correlative
93. See Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843) (overlying
owner has absolute ownership of the right to use percolating groundwater below his
property, even to the detriment of his neighbors).
Louisiana, historically better aligned with and thus reflective of the civil law traditions
of continental Europe, reaches the same result. Though the landowner does not actually
own uncaptured minerals under his land, he has the exclusive right to go onto his land
and search for them and keep any he reduces to possession. This right can be conveyed
to assignees by the use of servitudes which prescribe, or terminate for lack of use, causing
the right to revert to the surface owner. La. R.S. 31:21 (1986). See also Adams v. Grigsby,
152 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writ denied, 244 La. 662, 153 So. 2d 880 (1963)
(underground water is unowned, like wild animals, ferae natura, over which ownership
is acquired by capturing and reducing to possession).
94. Note, Water Law-Groundwater-A Filter for a Muddy Issue?, Prather v. Ei-
senmann, 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978), 12 Creighton L. Rev. 431, 433 (1978).
95. Especially in the context of oil exploitation, landowners perceiving that their
neighbors were systematically draining the resource below their own land would hasten
to drill and "capture" as much as they could before the supply ran out. This often led
to inefficient depletion of the reservoirs and gluts on the market for the commodity. The
jurisprudence superimposed an implied duty "not to commit a surface nuisance .. . [nor]
injury to the ... reservoir." See Summers, The Modern Theory and Practical Application
of Statutes for the Conservation of Oil and Gas, 13 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1938). See also
Note, supra note 94, at 434-35.
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rights recognized that all landowners have equal rights in the underlying
resources, and where they are insufficient for the demand for them,
each owner should get a proportionate share. 96 The correlative rights
doctrine proved especially useful for unitizing oil and gas reservoirs once
these came to be recognized as pools of trapped fluids instead of
underground streams. 91 The American rule viewed it as unreasonable to
use one's ownership in underground resources by selling the water ex-
tracted from one's property for use on some distant land or by excessively
or wastefully using it near the well site. As long as the water use
benefitted the land from which it was drawn, it was reasonable. 98
A fundamentally distinct doctrine prevails today in the more arid
western states of the United States, where an established use may be
treated as having prescribed into a permanent right. Under the "prior
appropriation" doctrine, the water rights holder need not be a landowner
nor his assignee, and a landowner has no inherent right to the water
under his land. Water rights vest in the first person to exploit a.given
source, and lesser rights accrue to later users; rights may be lost if such
use ceases. Some states treat groundwater as public property and regulate
beneficial uses according to public priorities. California incorporates the
doctrine of correlative rights into prior appropriation, recognizing ri-
parian ownership of a right to reasonable use of the groundwater, with
any excess over that amount subject to prior appropriation."
The appropriateness of these competing doctrines largely depends
upon the climate. One hydrology expert mapped the states adopting
each approach, thereby demonstrating graphically that the riparian doc-
trines dominate in the humid regions of the country, mostly in the
Mississippi River watershed and Atlantic seaboard states.1'° Another
author suggests that the appropriative doctrine will spread naturally into
96. Note, supra note 94, at 434-36, 438. See also Summers, supra note 95, at 14.
97. Unitizing consists of the scientific determination of the limits of an underground
pool of a fluid and the recognition of rights to the production therefrom by each surface
owner in proportion to his land area overlying the unit. For an informative discussion
of the history of the correlative rights doctrine and unitization in the oil and gas industry,
see Summers, supra note 95, at 14.
98. Summers, supra note 95, at 14. See also Note, supra note 94, at 434-36.
99. C. Fetter, supra note 88, at 388. See also Note, supra note 94, at 438, and R.
Kazman, supra note 86, at 239.
100. The hydrologist mapped areas of the continental United States and demonstrated
thereby the following: (a) the appropriative doctrine dominates in the Rocky Mountain
regions of the western states of Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah and
Wyoming; (b) riparian doctrines govern in the eastern half of the United States, roughly
corresponding to the Mississippi River watershead states and the Atlantic seaboard; (c)
the remaining states have adopted both types of doctrines as appropriate, demonstrating
that both can co-exist within a given jurisdiction if needed. R. Kazman, supra note 86,
at 240 (citing H. Thomas,- Water Rights in Areas of Ground-Water Mining, 347 U.S.
Geol. Surv. Circ. 3 (1955)).
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more humid regions once increased utilization of groundwater creates
or aggravates drought conditions.10' Yet, for a variety of reasons,10 2 arid
climate solutions may not be directly applicable in humid regions. Li-
kewise, riparian rights falter when multistate solutions are needed.103
These conflicts will likely be aggravated by pollution of aquifers from
contaminated surface waters or by the disposal of industrial wastes into
subsurface injection wells.101
2. Federal Attention to the Problem
Congress has only tangentially approached the regulation of ground-
water itself. In all, six statutes give the EPA authority over areas which
may affect groundwater. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)' 0 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA),' °0 or "Superfund" Act, provide
long range prevention programs and immediate emergency response to
environmental threats from hazardous wastes which may, among other
things, threaten groundwater. The focus of these, however, is upon
handling of the pollutant, and upon mobilization of efforts to clean up
spills and dumpsites once their threats become recognized. Their focus
is not upon groundwater as a resource. The Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA)07 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) °0 likewise focus upon specific pollutants which may find
101. R. Kazman, supra note 86, at 240.
102. There is an "enormous time lag between the start of ground-water offtake and
[the first signs of deleterious effects]," making the appropriative doctrine difficult to
enforce. Groundwater extraction may reduce streamflow, causing priority problems between
groundwater and surface stream users where the former's resource is replenished from
the streams relied upon by the latter. Whom will be empowered to decide the highest
and best use of a resource historically regarded as endless? Id. at 240-44.
103. This is one of the factors regarded as significant in the role of the CWA in
interstate disputes over waste disposal into interstate waters by residents of the upstream
state. R. Beck and C. Goplerud, supra note 3, § 203.2, at 24-25. Under 33 U.S.C. §
1311 (1982), states are required to determine the uses to which the stream shall be put,
the total maximum daily load of pollutants it can sustain consistent with this use, and
then allocate this load among present and future polluters. Plans for such allocation are
-to be submitted to the EPA for review and approval. States could conceivably dispute
each others' determinations at all three stages. For a demonstration of just how complex
interstate dispute resolution of groundwater issues can be, see Comment, Interstate Ground-
water Rights: Protecting the Interests of the States, 20 S.D. L. Rev. 641 (1975).
104. It should be readily apparent from the bank storage discussion, supra note 91
and accompanying text, that alluvial aquifers inherently straddle state lines, since major
streams often serve as a classic boundary marker between jurisdictions. The best example
of this in the United States, of course, is the Mississippi River.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
108. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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their way into groundwater by regulating the manufacture and distri-
bution of such products. The primary attention to groundwater protec-
tion comes from the Safe Drinking Water Act, 1 9 and, arguably, the
CWA.
a. The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)"0 covers only groundwater
that may be used for drinking. Introduced contemporarily with federal
assumption of the leadership role in environmental matters by the 1972
amendments to the CWA, it establishes the EPA as overseer of approved
state programs. If a state fails to submit an approved program, the
EPA must establish its own protection plans for the state. Through the
use of primary and secondary drinking water quality regulations,"' these
programs control the quantity of various contaminants, organic and
inorganic, which may occur in public water supply systems. Alternatively,
the program may establish a technology standard by which such systems
will be treated, if determination of the contaminant levels is infeasible." 2
The SDWA's second feature requires states or the EPA to pro-
mulgate underground injection controls (UIC's). The SDWA authorizes
the EPA to establish minimum requirements for such programs," 3 civil
and criminal enforcement of the requirements," 4 and grants of 50-90%0
subsidies to states for development of their implementation programs." 5
It also grants the EPA emergency powers to deal with imminent threats
to public water systems or underground sources of drinking water for
such systems" 6 when state authorities have not acted to protect the
health of persons affected. The EPA's UIC regulations" 7 group wells
into five classes"' and prohibit, with exceptions, any underground in-
jections without a permit.' 9
109. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-11 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
110. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-11 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). For a general discussion
of the history and purpose of the SDWA, see Douglas, Safe Drinking Water Act of
1974-History and Critique, 5 Envtl. Aff. 501 (1976).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1)-(2) (1982). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 141, 143 (1986).
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(7) (West Supp. 1987).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 300h (1982). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 144, 146 (1986).
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-2 (West Supp. 1987).
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-7(k) (West Supp. 1987).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300i (West Supp. 1987).
117. 40 C.F.R. §§ 144-146 (1986).
118. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (1986).
119. The exceptions are significant. They exclude wells outside the state's boundaries,
individual waste systems (e.g., septic tanks), non-residence disposal systems serving less
than twenty persons per day, wells injecting gaseous pipeline quality hydrocarbons, and
any disposals whatsoever into holes which are wider than they are deep (these fall outside
the definition of a well, and thus outside the statute). 40 C.F.R. § 144.1(g)(2) (1986).
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The SDWA culminated a long history of concern directly with the
safety of public drinking water supplies. States had already benefitted
from standards established by the Community Water Supply Study
(CWSS), 120 but compliance with these standards was slow in coming and
inconsistent. The SDWA served to force states with public water systems
not in compliance to take steps to bring about improvements. 12 , Thus,
the SDWA amounts to a federally mandated state regulatory scheme
imposed upon those who supply drinking water for a price. 2 It not
only does not establish "ambient" contamination levels for groundwater
generally, but it only applies to the systems under which drinking water
is sold. As seen earlier, 23 this amounts to only 75076 of the one half
of groundwater used for drinking, or only about 37.501o of all ground-
water. The UIC program is limited to only injections into wells, and
then only wells which threaten public water systems. 24 The SDWA does
not reach all point sources as does the CWA. 125 There is no federal
coverage of over 60% of groundwater unless such protection arises from
other sources.
b. The Clean Water Act
Taken literally, the CWA gives the EPA authority over groundwater
in several repects. Section 104 requires the EPA to maintain a surveillance
system to monitor water quality of both surface and groundwater. 26
Section 208 provides for EPA monitoring of state area wide planning
120. Bureau of Water Hygiene, United States Public Health Service, H.E.W., Com-
munity Water Supply Study-Analysis of National Survey Findings (1970), as cited in
Douglas, supra note 110, at 506.
121. The CWSS assessed the status of drinking water quality and supply systems. It
indicated deficiencies in the quality of water, surveillance systems, and in purification
capacity nationwide. Only 59% of the almost 1000 systems studied were delivering sat-
isfactory water. The CWSS contained recommendations for standards of water quality,
training for water system personnel, and outside inspection programs. It played a key
role in the deliberations before Congress on the SDWA. Id. at 506-08.
122. "lNlational primary drinking water regulations . . . shall apply to each public
water system in each State, except that such regulations shall not apply to a public water
system .'. . which does not sell water to any person . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 300g (1982).
123. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 119.
125. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(e) (1982). See also 33 U.S.C. 1362(14) (1982) (defining "point
source" as "any discernible, discrete conveyance including but not limited to any pipe,
ditch, channel, conduit, well, . . . container, ... vessel or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged").
126. "The Administrator shall establish national programs [which] . . . in cooperation
with the States . . . establish, equip, and maintain a water quality surveillance system for
the purpose of monitoring the quality of the navigable waters and ground waters.
33 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(5) (1982).
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programs for waste treatment facilities.1 27 Section 303 addresses the
development of water quality standards generally, requiring oversight of
state implementation plans and development of federal schemes where
states have none. This section expresses, inter alia, the motive of pro-
tection of public health. 128 Section 304 requires the EPA to develop and
publish water quality criteria which reflect the latest scientific knowledge
on the effects on the health and welfare which may be expected from
pollutants in any body of water including groundwater.' 29 Finally, Section
402, which creates the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), the primary permit authority granted the EPA, allows the
agency to turn its operation over to a state once that state submits an
approved implementation plan. The EPA cannot, however, approve such
a plan if the state does not have authority to control disposal of
pollutants into wells. 130
Thus, express language in the CWA suggests that the statute assumes
the same leadership role over groundwater that Congress clearly assumed
for surface waters. Nowhere, however, does the CWA confirm that the
EPA shall address groundwater pollution to the extent that it does
surface water pollution through the NPDES programs. This conflict has
not gone untested in the courts.
3. Federal Case Law
Despite statutory indications that Congress meant for the EPA to
regulate at least the pollution of groundwater, federal case law has been
at best equivocal on the subject. For example, in direct contradiction
to the indication in Section 402 of the CWA just discussed, a Texas
district court found in United States v. GAF Corp.' that Section 301
of the statute' 2 did not cover the disposal of chemical wastes into a
127. "Any [such] plan ... shall include . . . a process to control the disposal of
pollutants on land or in subsurface excavations within such area to protect ground and
surface water quality." 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(K) (1982).
128. "Such standards shall be such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance
the quality of water and .. . tak[e] into consideration their use[s] and value for public
water supplies ...." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1982).
129. "The Administrator .. . shall develop and publish .. .criteria for water quality
accurately reflecting the latest scientific knowledge on the kind and extent of all identifiable
effects .. . [of] the presence of pollutants in any body of water, including ground water
*.. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (1982).
130. "The Administrator shall approve each such submitted program unless . . . au-
thority does not exist [t]o issue permits which .. . control the disposal of pollutants into
wells ...." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(l)(D) (1982).
131. 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982). Section 301 defines the standards of technology required
to be dedicated to different types of pollution sources at different dates during the phase-
in of the statute's authority, and declares that no pollutants shall be discharged except
in compliance therewith.
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deep well.' In granting a summary judgement for want of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the court relied on Congress' failure to pass a 1972 amend-
ment to the CWA emphasizing regulation of groundwater under the
statute. '"4
The circuit courts differ about coverage of groundwater. The United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Exxon v. Train'3 5
reviewed the legislative history of the CWA in light of the EPA's position
that, since it could not approve a state plan which failed to provide
such authority under state law, 3 6 the EPA itself must have jurisdiction
over deep well disposals. Agreeing with the district court in GAF Corp.,
the Fifth Circuit saw the failure of Congress to include groundwater in
the 1972 amendments to the CWA as an indication that Congress did
not intend the EPA to have such authority. ' 7 The court conceded,
though, that Congress meant for the EPA and states to at least "begin
developing the information necessary to assess and deal with groundwater
pollution,"'3 probably to encourage the states to protect groundwater 39
and to benefit from the knowledge being developed by the EPA while
retaining control of their groundwater pollution control programs. 140
The Seventh Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion in
United States Steel Corp. v. Train,'4' at least "where the regulation is
undertaken in conjunction with limitations on ... discharges into surface
waters.' 42 Examining the same legislative history and the Senate Report
of the bill, the Seventh Circuit found Congressional intent to prevent
the disposal of wastes into deep wells. 43 The court noted that Congress'
failure in 1972 to pass the Aspin Amendments, which would have
affirmatively included groundwater in the CWA, and in which failure
the GAF Corp. and Exxon courts put so much store, more likely
133. Section 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982), is incorporated by reference into Section
402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1982).
134. 389 F. Supp. at 1383-84. The court also rejected as speculative an argument that
implicit in the EPA's authority is the power to approve state programs only if they have
groundwater control authority and that such is a necessary condition of the EPA's NPDES
program authority. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
135. 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977).
136. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
137. 554 F.2d at 1322.
138. Id. at 1323.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1324.
141. 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
142. Id. at 852.
143. Id. at 852-83. See also S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668.
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amounted to a rejection of additional burdens on the oil industry than
a rejection of comprehensive coverage of the act. 144
More recently, in Kelly v. United States, 45 a Michigan district court
found that authority over groundwater contamination lies with the states
rather that with the EPA under the CWA. The state attorney general
had filed a citizen action authorized by Section 505 of the CWA
146
against the United States Coast Guard for allegedly injecting toxic chem-
icals into the ground, the plume of which had spread to a nearby bay.
The court agreed with the reasoning in Exxon that the legislative history
indicated that Congress meant to leave the authority over groundwater
to the states. 147
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The foregoing presents a fragmented program of groundwater reg-
ulation based partly upon two theories of common law, implemented
inconsistently among the fifty states, and federal attention to diverse
problems as they have arisen. There appears to be no comprehensive
national program to protect the groundwater resources of this country
which, like th surface environment, may become increasingly threatened
by industrialization and agricultural pollution. This could develop into
what will become the latest tragedy of the commons. 41
Pollutants in our environment must be dealt with, and there seem
to be only three general ways to do so: (1) expel them into the air,
either directly or by incineration; (2) store or discharge them at the
surface, either in dumpsites or into nearby streams; and (3) inject them
into subsurface strata through deep injection wells. Pollution of ground-
water can occur from all three of these alternatives, but from some
more than others. All three are regulated by federal statutes to some
degree. The first two are covered respectively by the Clean Air Act 49
144. The two-part Aspin amendments, in addition to affirming that the CWA covered
groundwater, deleted as an unfair discrimination against other industries the exception of
Section 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982), for oil and gas production. Since, at the time,
over 9901o of all injection wells were operated by the oil and gas industry, this is a
reasonable view of Congress' rejection of the amendment. United States Steel Corp. v.
Train, 556 F.2d at 853 n.66. See also Wilson, supra note 85, at 555-56.
145. 618 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Mich. 1985).
146. "[Any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person
(including the United States . . .) who is alleged to be in violation of an efflent standard
or limitation .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982).
147. 618 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
148. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968) (Absent inter-
vention by common rule, as long as an individual derives greater benefit from the use
of a commonly owned resource than his proportionate cost of replenishment or depletion,
he will continue to exploit it, even to its destruction.).
149. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
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and by FIFRA, TSCA, RCRA, and CERCLA mentioned earlier;'50 the
latter of these is covered comprehensively by the CWA. However, the
last alternative seems to a large degree to have been neglected by
Congress. Certainly the SDWA covers a portion of it, but unless the
CWA provides the comprehensive regulation for groundwater that it
does for surface water, then the majority of groundwater used in the
United States comes into commerce unregulated at the federal level.
Groundwater certainly falls within the reach of the commerce clause.
Groundwater used for irrigation and industry represents over half the
groundwater supplies used anywhere in the country. After Wickard v.
Filburn,5' there is no reason to believe that either of these groundwater
uses could be confined to a business so small that it could not be
reached by the commerce clause. More often than not, groundwater
aquifers bridge state lines because of bank storage along streams serving
as state boundaries. Finally, the Supreme Court recently affirmed that
Congress could regulate groundwater. 5 2 If in fact Congress did omit
groundwater regulation when it passed the matrix of pollution control
statutes in the last fifteen years, one wonders why.
Such an omission should not be lightly judged improper or inad-
vertent. Initially, it was commonly believed that groundwater is im-
pregnable to pollution due to the natural filter effect of aquifers and
the screening of pollutants by ground cover.' 53 Congress may well have
intended that this area of the environment be left unregulated. Alter-
natively, Congress may have thought groundwater is adequately regulated
among the various states. Thirdly, Congress may have felt it was too
early to tell how most groundwater should be regulated, and only
intended for the CWA to provide helpful information to the states in
the interim.
One justification for Congress' reluctance emphatically to declare
groundwater within the EPA's primary responsibility may be that the
activity of regulation of groundwater has become firmly entrenched as
a traditional state function. State laws regulating ownership rights to
groundwater were well developed long before Congress' environmental
150. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
151. 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942) (The commerce clause is competent to reach
the individual consumption decisions of a single farmer on the theory that others similarly
situated form a class sizable enough to exert a substantial economic effect upon interstate
commerce.).
152. Sporhose v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1981)
(declared invalid a statute requiring reciprocity agreement with neighboring state before
Nebraska residents could pump groundwater to their contiguous tracts in the other state,
because it interfered with interstate commerce; groundwater is an area Congress could
regulate if it chose).
153. R. Beck and C. Goplerud, supra note 3, at 267.
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leadership matured. Further, obtaining water supplies is usually carried
out at the private local or municipal level, with state assistance where
necessary. Considerable amounts of money are expended by states to
obtain water and to handle it in the process of delivery to consumers.
It is unlikely Congress would wish to supplant these programs. It is
equally unlikely, however, that states will readily tolerate the possibility
that the EPA might interfere with their arrangements to supply their
residents with so critical a staple of life as drinking water. Yet this is
exactly what Congress found to be necessary with the SDWA.
Injecting pollution into the ground below the water table means
contaminating an aquifer for many years to come. The only way such
an aquifer can cleanse itself is through dispersion of the wastes resulting
from flow of the groundwater into other strata. Though this may take
years, it will eventually migrate to other aquifers, because water seeps
through even the most impermeable rock layers through cracks. It is
one thing to talk of confined aquifers separated from other porous rock
strata by these "impermeable" rock layers when the leakage from one
aquifer to another is insignificant compared with the flow through each
due to recharge and outtake. The consequences of one aquifer leaking
clean water into another are minimal at worst. However, when one of
these aquifers has become contaminated by pollutants, even small leak-
ages may become quite serious. It was exactly this thought which led
the EPA absolutely to preclude injection wells discharging into aquifers
underlying public water system sources. 54
Even if the injection well is nowhere near a public water system
source, it can still threaten human health. Aquifers which do not supply
public water systems selling water are not covered by the SDWA; in-
dividual rural residential home wells for domestic use may receive no
protection. Industrial water use, even if it adds no pollutants of its
own, may involve dumping contaminated groundwater into surface water
bodies once the water has been used in processes. This alone suggests
that the CWA may cover the industry's source water, because the statute
clearly covers the industry's discharges. Most alarming, and perhaps
worst of all, water taken from a contaminated aquifer may be used to
irrigate agricultural products which eventually pass into the food chain.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has sanctioned a broad reading of the Corps'
jurisdiction under the CWA, rather than a narrow one adopted by the
Sixth Circuit to avoid a taking clause violation. The effect may have
been to recognize that the groundwater serving as the only hydrologic
154. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (1986). See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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link between the wetlands and the navigable waters falls within the
jurisdiction of the Corps and the EPA as well. The definition of na-
vigable waters is not confined to the permitting sections of either agency,
but pervades the whole Act. Certainly the definition must apply to the
EPA equally because of the structure of the statute.
Because of the Court's approach to affirming the Corps' judgment
of its tasks, declining to decide once and for all what Congress intended,
Riverside really decides nothing about how far the agencies may reach
under the CWA. The opinion neither circumscribes the CWA nor af-
firms that it has reached to the maximum extent possible under the
Constitution by virtue of the current regulations. It does, however,
confirm that the CWA can reach at least as far as the Corps and the
EPA have said it does. It reaches all waters hydrologically connected
to traditionally regulated waters of the United States.
Arguably there is a basis to infer that the Court would approve
further expansions by these agencies into traditionally state regulated
areas. In fact, it may suggest that the EPA could fill the perceived void
in groundwater protection by simply writing regulations which clearly,
and reasonably, include groundwater. As noted earlier, however, the
EPA plans to proceed at a more cautious pace with its groundwater
strategy, relying upon a matrix of other statutes instead of the CWA.115
The extent to which this will serve the policy concerns remains to be
seen.
Because of the nature of groundwater and the strong policy reasons
for comprehensive regulation of it, Riverside may understandably be
read to suggest that the entire hydrologic system, including the ground-
water, may be regulated as "waters of the United States." The opinion
seems to answer part of the questions raised in GAF Corp.156 and
Exxon15 7 as to alluvial groundwater subject to bank storage. Even in
those cases, the respective courts admitted groundwater would be in-
cluded if the agencies had alleged that it would flow into surface waters
within the jurisdiction of the CWA. Riverside confirms that at least
this is reasonable under the statute. However, for the strong policy
demands to be achieved, a comprehensive program can no more be
limited to regulating alluvial aquifers than it can be limited to the
coverage of the SDWA. A comprehensive groundwater protection scheme
must address all groundwater.
Most of the federal jurisprudence seems to be to the contrary. Of
course, the ideal solution would be for Congress to recognize that its
efforts at legislation to date have appeared to the courts to be ambiguous,
155. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
156. 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
157. 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977).
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and to get off the fence by clarifying whether it wants the leadership
role in groundwater regulation. Presently, for the Corps or the EPA to
attempt to assert jurisdiction over groundwater, they would do well to
rely upon more solid authority than Riverside. The decision does, how-
ever, strongly suggest that such a position would not be unreasonable.
Guy V. Manning
